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ABSTRACT
In this article, I present some worries about the possible impact of global efforts 
to aid the needy in some of the world’s most desperate regions. Among the worries 
I address are possible unintended negative consequences that may occur elsewhere 
in a society when aid agencies hire highly qualified local people to promote their 
agendas; the possibility that foreign interests and priorities may have undue influ-
ence on a country’s direction and priorities, negatively impacting local authority 
and autonomy; and the related problem of outside interventions undermining the 
responsiveness of local and national governments to their citizens.
Another issue I discuss is the possibility that efforts to aid the needy may involve 
an Each-We Dilemma, in which case conflicts may arise between what is individually ra-
tional or moral, and what is collectively rational or moral. Unfortunately, it is possible 
that if each of us does what we have most reason to do, morally, in aiding the needy, 
we together will bring about an outcome which is worse, morally, in terms of its overall 
impact on the global needy.
The article ends by briefly noting a number of claims and arguments that I made 
in my 2017 Uehiro Lectures regarding how good people should respond in a world of 
need. As I have long argued, I have no doubt that those who are well off are open to 
serious moral criticism if they ignore the plight of the needy. Unfortunately, however, 
for a host of both empirical and philosophical reasons, what one should do in light of 
that truth is much more complex, and murky, than most people have realized.
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PART I. INTRODUCTION.
For most of my life, I have been deeply concerned about the problems of the 
global needy, and for many years, I have published and lectured on the topic (Temkin 
1999, 2004a, 2004b). 
Along with Peter Singer, I helped launch the University of Manchester chapter 
of the Effective Altruist organization, Giving What We Can and, along with Jeffrey 
Sachs, I helped launch the Princeton University chapter of that organization. In my 
lectures and writings, I have long contended that most of those in the developed 
world are open to serious moral criticism, when they basically ignore, as most of us 
do, the plight of the world’s needy. I continue to think that. Nevertheless, philoso-
phers are required to subject even their deepest and most longstanding commitments 
to critical scrutiny, and to follow the arguments wherever they lead. And in recent 
years, I have become increasingly worried about possible negative impacts of global 
efforts to aid the needy in some of the world’s most desperate regions. In this article, 
I raise some of those worries.
The article contains four main parts. In Part II, I address some worries about 
certain marketplace distortions that can arise as a result of aid efforts on behalf of 
the needy in some of the world’s poorest countries. In particular, I note some pos-
sible unintended negative consequences that may occur elsewhere in a society when 
aid agencies hire highly qualified local people to promote their agendas. In Part III, I 
discuss the possibility that foreign interests and priorities may have undue influence 
on a country’s direction and priorities, negatively impacting local authority and au-
tonomy; and the related problem of outside interventions undermining the respon-
siveness of local and national governments to their citizens. In Part IV, I discuss the 
possibility that efforts to aid the needy may involve an Each-We Dilemma, in which 
case conflicts may arise between what is individually rational or moral, and what is 
collectively rational or moral. Drawing on results from my book, Rethinking the Good 
(2012), I argue that it is possible that if each of us does what we have most reason to do, 
morally, in aiding the needy, we together will bring about an outcome which is worse, 
morally, in terms of its overall impact on the global needy. In Part V, I respond to the 
view that we shouldn’t provide direct aid to people in the world’s poorest countries, 
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because doing so contributes to poor governance within such countries. In Part VI, 
I end by offering a few claims that I made in my 2017 Uehiro Lectures regarding how 
good people should respond in a world of need. Unfortunately, in this article I must 
be content to merely offer those claims, without further argument.
I am acutely aware that this article, which is based on the third of my three 2017 
Uehiro Lectures, is only a preliminary treatment of the issues explored. Equally im-
portant, there are a host of other crucial issues related to the topic of how good people 
should respond in a world of need that this article doesn’t even broach. But no one 
article can address every important issue, and I believe the issues I am addressing here 
are deserving of much more attention than they have typically been given, at least in 
the philosophical literature. I hope to give a much fuller treatment of this important 
topic in a book tentatively titled Being Good in a World of Need to be published as part 
of the Uehiro Lectures Book Series.
 Because this article mainly raises worries about the possible negative effects of 
efforts to aid the needy in some of the world’s poorest countries, let me emphasize, at 
the outset, that I remain as committed, as ever, to the view that those of us in a posi-
tion to do so—which includes almost everyone in the so-called developed world—
have a strong moral imperative to find ways of effectively helping our world’s worst-
off members. Unfortunately, however, for a host of both empirical and philosophical 
reasons, it is much less clear to me now, than it once was, what we should actually do 
in light of that truth.
PART II. MARKET PLACE DISTORTIONS.
One common worry regarding global aid, concerns the possibility of corruption, 
and ways in which aid efforts may benefit evil agents, and give rise to perverse incen-
tives and indirect, negative effects (Easterly 2006, Moyo 2010, Wenar 2011, Deaton 
2013, and Temkin 2017b). Unfortunately, aid efforts can also give rise to indirect, nega-
tive effects when no corruption or evil actions are involved. Moreover, these negative 
effects are easily overlooked and difficult to quantify.
I start with a point familiar to global health experts. International aid groups 
promote many worthy projects. They might improve the water supply, build new 
schools, bring electricity to villages, construct medical clinics, and so on. As a result, 
they may hire many local workers: managers, engineers, principals, teachers, doctors, 
nurses, administrative staff, drivers, road pavers, well diggers, wire stringers, and 
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so on. Naturally, the most effective aid groups seek to hire the best people they can 
for these positions. Ideally, they will hire personable people with good leadership, 
managerial, and communication skills, who work well with others, and are dedicated, 
trustworthy, hardworking, reliable, and so on.
Aid groups will be in competition with each other for such people and, thanks 
to their donors, will be able to offer higher pay, fewer hours, and better working con-
ditions than the local standard. Accordingly, highly qualified people from across the 
region will seek these jobs.
As described, so far, this sounds like a win/win/win situation. Hiring such tal-
ented people will be great for the needy, the workers themselves, and the aid groups, 
enabling them to truthfully show their donors how they have effectively achieved 
their goals. Unfortunately, left out of this rosy account is what happens elsewhere in 
the system as a result of the successful, well-intentioned, aid efforts.
In particular, one needs to worry about the indirect effects of hiring such people 
away from whatever jobs they might otherwise occupy (Leif Wenar also recognizes 
this worry, see 2011). Governments in poor countries desperately need talented engi-
neers, accountants, lawyers, teachers, doctors, nurses, managers, and civil servants 
working on behalf of the general public. Unfortunately, however, most poor govern-
ments cannot match the pay scale or working conditions that many aid groups offer. 
This may result in an internal “brain and character drain” away from public sector 
jobs, which may have a significantly deleterious effect on the efficiency and success of 
the government, the economy, and public projects.
Moreover, depending on the disparities between salaries and working condi-
tions, one might see highly trained professionals leaving jobs that require all of their 
talents, for jobs for which they are overqualified. Thus, due to marketplace distor-
tions that well-funded aid groups may inadvertently create, some outstanding teach-
ers, engineers, accountants, lawyers, doctors, nurses, and civil servants may happily 
give up their posts to become administrators, clerks, drivers, or manual laborers. If 
that happens, the overall costs their society bears, when such people are no longer 
performing jobs befitting their talents, may substantially outweigh the relative gains 
their society gets due to their successfully fulfilling their new positions.
Here is a related problem. Highly talented, hard-working people of great char-
acter will always be in demand. Such people may well get used to an aid group’s 
pay scale and high quality working conditions. Moreover, such people may receive 
special training or make connections with well-placed aid officials which enable them 
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to compete for comparable positions outside of their countries. So, what will happen 
when an aid group shuts down its local operation? Its highly talented workforce might 
return to the low pay and poor working conditions of their previous places of em-
ployment, where their skills might be desperately needed. Or, they might seek better 
prospects in the developed world where the need for their talents is much less great, 
but the personal rewards are far greater.
There is an old question: “how do you keep people down on the farm once they 
have seen the lights of the big city?” There is a kernel of truth embedded in that ques-
tion which underlies my worry here. No one can blame aid groups for hiring highly 
talented people to efficiently promote their important goals. Nor can one blame such 
people for bettering themselves and their families. Yet, together, these perfectly un-
derstandable and laudable goals may contribute to both internal and external “brain 
and character drains” that can be deeply problematic for the world’s poorest coun-
tries (though, importantly, so-called brain “drains” can also have positive effects on 
poor countries when accompanied by remittances that overseas workers send back to 
their home countries).
Thus, an aid group’s gains, which are often readily identified and quantified, 
may be offset by indirect losses elsewhere in the system in ways that are easily over-
looked and difficult to quantify. This can result in a distorted picture of the overall 
good that an aid group is doing. I am not claiming that the net effect of such trade-
offs will necessarily be negative, though in some cases it may be. But merely that the 
desirability of supporting an aid group must take full account of the opportunity 
costs of doing so, including not only where else I might spend my money, but also 
what else an aid group’s local workers would be doing, if they weren’t working for the 
aid group. Unfortunately, given the countless aid groups that operate in some of the 
world’s poorest regions, the cumulative impact of the negative effects that I have been 
describing may be substantial.
PART III. RESPONSIVENESS AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE.
Let me turn next to a worry raised by Angus Deaton, a leading international 
development expert and the 2015 Nobel Prize Winner in Economics. Deaton is deeply 
concerned about the world’s needy, but after analyzing data about economic devel-
opment in the world’s poorest regions, and searching for correlations between how 
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much international aid a poor country receives and its level of social and economic 
development, Deaton has arrived at a striking conclusion: people like Peter Singer are 
doing more harm than good! Specifically, Deaton believes that if we genuinely want 
to aid the world’s needy, we must find some route to do so other than by contribut-
ing to aid groups that work directly in the world’s poorest regions to ameliorate their 
desperate conditions (see Deaton 2013, Chapter Seven).
Deaton knows that his conclusion is at odds with what most people think. It 
is, after all, deeply counterintuitive to believe that if external funding pours into a 
region of great need, explicitly earmarked to address those needs, that, overall, the 
result should prove fruitless, at best, or harmful, at worst. Deaton also recognizes 
that fully explaining his findings is not easy. Still, Deaton suggests several factors 
that might help account for his findings and support his counterintuitive conclusion.
Consider first,
The Paradox of Aid: in countries where the need is greatest, aid won’t help; 
while in countries where aid would help most, it isn’t needed.
If there is a kernel of truth to this Paradox, as many development economists 
believe, it reflects the crucial role that governments play in their countries’ social and 
economic progress. The basic thought is that good governments find a way to take 
care of their people’s basic needs; while poor governments are either unable, or un-
willing, to do so. Even worse, poor governments tend to obstruct aid efforts, so that 
any gains will be short term, at best. On this view, substantial and long-lasting social 
and economic gains require a well-functioning government which can formulate 
and effectively implement plans to develop infrastructure, energy, food production, 
schools, the health system, etc. Aid groups, no matter how well-intentioned or well-
funded, cannot accomplish this on their own.
What makes a government well-functioning? Deaton believes the key compo-
nent of a well-functioning government is that it be responsive to its citizens’ needs, 
interests, and will. With that in mind, Deaton suggests that what primarily accounts 
for the counterproductiveness of international aid efforts in the world’s poorest 
regions is that they tend to undermine the governments’ responsiveness to their citi-
zens. But, to repeat, on Deaton’s view, it is precisely such responsiveness that is nec-
essary for any poor country’s long-term social and economic development.
The mechanisms by which international aid may undermine governments’ re-
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sponsiveness to their people include the following. First, corrupt governments may 
find ways of capturing aid resources for their own purposes. They may impose licens-
ing fees that fill their coffers; tax or demand kickbacks from aid beneficiaries; extort 
bribes in return for government cooperation; insist that aid groups employ their sup-
porters; require aid groups to supply them with food, medicine, or other supplies; 
and so on. In sum, there are many ways in which corrupt governments can divert aid 
resources to strengthen their positions and advance their agendas. This can enable 
such governments to be indifferent and unresponsive to their citizens’ needs, inter-
ests, and will, and to put their own interests, and those of their supporters, ahead of 
their general populations’.
Second, in many of the world’s poorest regions many outside aid groups operate. 
Some address hunger; others poverty; others rape or victims of sectarian violence; 
others victims of particular illnesses, such as malaria, tuberculosis, diarrhea, or AIDs; 
others pre-natal, post-natal, and maternal health care; others health care more gener-
ally; others education; others female empowerment; others infrastructure; and so on. 
Of course, some agencies will address multiple concerns. This all sounds desirable. 
But if so many aid groups are helping in so many ways, how come the problems of 
the needy continue to persist in the world’s poorest regions? Is it merely because not 
enough aid groups have been involved? Or not enough resources efficiently spent to 
eradicate the problems?
Deaton has another hypothesis. He believes that with so many aid groups 
working to help the needy, local governments can abdicate their responsibilities to 
provide for their citizens’ basic needs, and leave that task to the aid groups. The local 
governments can then shift the blame for any unmet needs to the aid groups, who 
have failed to fully deliver on their promises to help the needy! In other words, the 
well-intentioned interventions by aid groups can undermine the local governments’ 
responsiveness to their citizens’ needs, interests, and will. But, of course, if Deaton 
is correct, such responsiveness is a key characteristic of good governance, without 
which there can be no hope of a lasting solution to the social and economic woes of 
the world’s poorest nations.
The preceding points are intimately related to a third point. Generally, effective 
governments depend on taxing their citizens in order to generate revenue to provide 
for their citizens’ needs, to pay for basic government functions, and to advance their 
political agendas. However, the relation between a government and its taxpaying citi-
zens is special. Taxpaying citizens expect a return on their “hard earned dollars.” They 
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want a say in how their money is spent, and they want their government to provide for 
their basic needs, to protect and promote their interests, and to reflect their will. In 
other words, there will always be pressure for a government that taxes its citizens to 
be responsive to them. If it is not, it risks the citizens bucking the government, avoid-
ing their taxes and, if the situation is dire, replacing the government with a more 
responsive one.
However, in countries where substantial aid resources flow into the govern-
ment’s coffers, those governments can pursue their agendas without taxing their 
citizens to the same degree that they otherwise would. Correspondingly, citizens 
may feel less entitled to demand more from their government, as they can’t insist 
on having more of a say in how “their” money is spent, if it isn’t actually their money 
that is being spent. Moreover, in a nation where the government is receiving little 
tax money from its citizens, and where its citizens most pressing needs are being ad-
dressed by outside aid groups, the government can always claim (whether truthfully 
or not!) that it lacks the resources to do more to help its citizens and that it has es-
tablished relations with external groups to provide for its citizens’ needs. So, again, 
if the citizens’ basic needs are unmet, the government can claim that the fault lies 
with the aid groups from the world’s richest countries, not with its own inadequa-
cies. In this way, too, aid efforts can undermine a government’s responsiveness to its 
citizens’ needs, interests, and will. It does this, in part, by shifting the responsibility 
for the countries’ needy from the governments to outside groups. As importantly, it 
does this by upsetting the normal relationship between a government and its taxpay-
ers; in virtue of which taxpaying citizens expect to have a say in their government’s 
direction and priorities, since they are paying for them. (There is a similar problem in 
many resource-rich countries, in the Middle East and elsewhere, where state control 
of a country’s rich resources enables royal families or ruling elites to push their social 
and political agendas without depending heavily on taxation to fund those agendas. 
This, in turn, often enables such governments to be unresponsive to the will of their 
citizens (Wenar, 2016)).
Finally, consider the old adage, “he who pays the piper, calls the tune.” This adage 
suggests that in poor countries where much of a government’s income is derived from 
external groups, rather than internal taxes, the governments of those countries will 
have strong reason to be responsive to the outside groups, and much less reason to be 
responsive to their own citizens.
There are two problems with this. First, each aid group will have its own agenda, 
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and its own view about the best way of fostering its agenda “on behalf of the needy.” 
Unsurprisingly, there will often be a gap between what the outsiders would like to ac-
complish, and how they want to accomplish it, and what the needy themselves would 
like done, and how they would like it done. This raises many troubling questions 
about paternalism, autonomy, and respect for local people, their values, and their 
ways of life. Unfortunately, I cannot pursue these here, however these questions will 
be addressed further in my book, Being Good in a World of Need. The second worry 
is that even if the aid groups are accomplishing great good, so that there are good 
reasons for the government to support their efforts, it remains true that being respon-
sive to the benevolent and paternalistic aims of outside aid groups is not the same as 
being directly responsive to one’s citizens. But it is the latter that is the mark of good 
governance, not the former.
In sum, Deaton believes that good governance is necessary for substantial and 
lasting social and economic progress in the world’s poorest countries, and that good 
governance requires a government’s being responsive to its people. Unfortunately, 
however, international aid efforts in many of the world’s poorest nations can under-
mine the responsiveness of those nations’ governments to their citizens. According 
to Deaton, this helps account for the empirical evidence, showing little substantial 
and lasting social and economic progress in many poor countries that have received 
great amounts of outside aid. Further, this helps explain Deaton’s counterintuitive 
claim that, despite their best intentions, aid groups and their donors may actually be 
doing more harm than good.
Deaton sums up his position as follows:
Aid and aid-funded projects have undoubtedly done much good; the roads, dams, 
and clinics exist and would not have existed otherwise. But the negative forces are 
always present; even in good environments aid compromises institutions, it con-
taminates local politics, and it undermines democracy. If poverty and underdevel-
opment are primarily consequences of poor institutions, then by weakening those 
institutions or stunting their development, large aid flows do exactly the opposite of 
what they are intended to do. It is hardly surprising then that, in spite of the direct 
effects of aid that are often positive, the record of aid show no evidence of any overall 
beneficial effect (2013, pp. 305-306).
There are many possible responses to Deaton’s view. One of the most natural 
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responses raises some especially important, and troubling, issues. Let me turn to that 
next.
PART IV. THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUAL VERSUS 
COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY AND MORALITY.
Many are unconvinced by Deaton’s worries.  They see his critique as support-
ing Effective Altruism.  Now in fact, Effective Altruism is a somewhat amorphous 
philosophical and social movement whose members share a common commitment 
to using reason and evidence to determine the most efficient morally permissible way 
of promoting one or more of the following goals:  aiding non-human animals, exis-
tential risks to sentient life on Earth, promoting the Effective Altruism movement 
itself, researching the most efficient way of promoting good, and aiding the world’s 
needy.  However, in this article, when I refer to Effective Altruism, I am referring to that 
portion of Effective Altruism which is concerned with identifying and supporting 
as efficiently as possible the international relief and development organizations that 
most effectively aid those people in the world’s poorest countries facing premature 
death or severely debilitating conditions as a result of poverty, famine, war, tyranny, 
ignorance, or disease.  
 In particular, in response to Deaton, many would argue as follows. Given 
that many people are in great need, and that many others could help them at little 
cost to themselves, it is crucial to identify and support the most effective aid groups. 
Obviously, we shouldn’t be supporting aid groups doing more harm than good, but 
equally obviously, it seems, there must be some aid groups doing more good than harm, 
and we should be supporting the most effective of those groups.
Deaton, himself, seems to offer support for this position. He grants that there 
have been some successful health initiatives—for example, early vaccination pro-
grams for smallpox or polio—where the costs associated with those initiatives may 
have been worth bearing (Deaton 2013, pp. 308-309). Given this, doesn’t it make 
sense to identify other programs where the costs Deaton worries about are worth 
bearing given the amount of good to be achieved? Why can’t Deaton simply support 
Effective Altruism? Instead of claiming that we shouldn’t be supporting international 
aid groups operating directly in the world’s poorest regions, why shouldn’t Deaton 
contend, more modestly, that we must be very careful about which aid groups we 
support, to make sure that they are, indeed, doing more good than harm?
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I believe the key to answering these questions lies in an important, and trou-
bling, fact about practical reasoning; namely, that conflicts that can arise between 
individual and collective rationality and morality. Parfit has referred to such conflicts 
as Each-We Dilemmas (Parfit 1984, Part One). Each-We Dilemmas arise when if each of a 
number of individuals does what is best, individually, by the lights of a given theory, 
they, collectively, do worse by the lights of that theory. The most famous examples 
of Each-We Dilemmas are Prisoners Dilemmas.1 The original Prisoners Dilemma, dis-
cussed by game theorists, is a two person dilemma, where if each of two prisoners 
does what is genuinely best for himself, according to the standard self-interest theory 
of individual rationality, they, together, will end up serving a large number of years 
in prison, say twenty years—ten years each!—rather than a much smaller number 
of years in prison, say, four years—only two years each! What makes the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma paradoxical is that each prisoner is fully aware of the predicament they are 
in, but there is no individually rational way of arriving at the outcome where each 
only spends two years in jail, rather than ten. Here, we have a conflict between the 
individually rational choice and the collectively rational choice. From the standpoint 
of what would be individually best for each of them, it is clear that each should act one 
way. However, from the standpoint of what would be collectively best for the two of 
them, together, it is clear that they should act another way.
Two person Prisoners Dilemmas are rare in the real world. However, Many-Person 
Prisoner’s Dilemmas frequently arise (Parfit 1984, Section 23, pp. 56-62). Unfortunately, 
it is often true that if each of a large group does what is best for herself in self-inter-
ested terms, they, together, will be much worse off than they would have been if they 
had instead done what was best for the group as a whole. So, for example: each farmer 
is better off, in self-interested terms, bringing as many crops to market as possible, no 
matter what the other farmers do—but, together, the farmers would be better off if they 
brought fewer crops to market, since too many will collapse the crop’s price; similarly, 
each fisherman would better off, in self-interested terms, harvesting as many fish as 
possible, no matter what the other fishermen decide to do—but, together, the fisher-
men would be better off if they harvested fewer fish, since harvesting too many will 
collapse the stocks and undermine their livelihoods; likewise, each taxpayer would 
be better off avoiding her taxes, whatever anyone else does—but, together, taxpayers 
will be worse off if they don’t pay their taxes than if they do, since a large tax base is 
1.  There is a massive literature on Prisoner’s Dilemmas, too massive to cite here. The Stanford En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy contains a nice article with a useful bibliography on the topic, available online.
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necessary for the provision of crucial government services and public goods; and so 
on.
In Reasons and Persons, Parfit showed that analogous Each-We Dilemmas can arise 
for deontological moralities (Parfit 1984, Section 36, 95-98). Specifically, Parfit showed 
that on deontological theories, people can be in the troubling position where if each 
of them does, individually, what she ought morally to do, they, together, will be doing 
something which, collectively, they ought not to do. Parfit’s result was fascinating 
and worrisome. In Rethinking the Good, I argued that consequentialist theories can 
face similar worries (Temkin 2012, Section 3.5, pp. 85-95). In particular, I argued that 
if one accepts certain anti-additive-aggregationist principles for comparing certain 
outcomes—as most people do—then even on consequentialist theories people can 
be in the troubling position where if each of them does, individually, what she ought, 
morally, to do, then they, together, will be bringing about an outcome which, collec-
tively, they ought not to bring about.
One such principle, which most people find plausible, is the following:
The Disperse Additional Burdens View: In general, if additional burdens are 
dispersed among different people, it is better for a given total burden to be dispersed 
among a vastly larger number of people, so that the additional burden any single 
person has to bear within her life is “relatively small,” than for a smaller total burden 
to fall on just a few, such that their additional burden is substantial (Temkin 2012, 
pp. 67-68).
Here is an example. Suppose an aid group could provide farming equipment to 
a village, which would relieve hunger in that village for 1,000 people for fifty years, 
or they could provide grain to 4,000,000 people, relieving their hunger for a single 
week. In accordance with the Disperse Additional Burdens View, many people hold 
that the outcome in which 1000 people had their hunger relieved for fifty years would 
be better than the outcome in which 4,000,000 people had their hunger relieved for 
a week, even though in the former case there would “only” be 2.6 million weeks of 
hunger relief. This is because relieving someone’s hunger for fifty years has a signifi-
cant impact on her life, while relieving someone’s hunger for only one week has rela-
tively little impact on the overall quality of her life.
Not everyone accepts anti-additive-aggregationist principles. Notoriously, they 
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are rejected by total utilitarians. But consider the following case (from Temkin 2012, 
see pp. 34-38, and also 42, 259-264, 339, and 484-488):
Lollipops for Life: In outcome A, countless people live very long lives, and 
they all have enormously satisfying lives along every important dimension of 
human life, along with, more trivially, lots of licks of many different lollipops 
over the course of their lives; unfortunately, however, A also involves one 
innocent person suffering unbearable agony for eighty straight years, before 
dying a slow, lonely, torturous death. By contrast, outcome B involves the 
same countless people living the same enormously satisfying lives, except 
that they each receive one less lick of a lollipop over the course of their very 
long lives; however, in B, the innocent person would be spared the agony 
and painful death, and would instead live a full rich life.
Total utilitarians are committed to the view that if only there were enough people 
each enjoying a tiny amount of pleasure from the one extra lick of a lollipop, then A 
would be better than B. Most people, including most consequentialists, reject the 
total utilitarian’s judgment about my Lollipops for Life case. For certain comparisons, 
at least, they reject total utilitarianism’s simple additive-aggregationist approach in 
favor of the anti-additive-aggregationist approach of principles like the Disperse 
Additional Burdens View.
For most people, then, the Disperse Additional Burdens View seems deeply 
compelling. However, it can give rise to consequentialist Each-We Dilemmas. To see 
this, consider the following example:
The Reservoir, the Drowning Child, and the Toxic Watch Battery: Uhuru is 
walking by a reservoir where a child is drowning. If she pauses to remove 
her watch before diving in, the child will suffer severe brain damage. If she 
doesn’t remove her watch, its battery will leach toxic chemicals into the res-
ervoir, increasing its pollution level by a very small amount. The reservoir is 
the main source of water for the region’s animal life and 1,000,000 people.
What should Uhuru do? Uhuru might plausibly reason as follows. If she removes 
her watch first, this will significantly impact the child. If she doesn’t, this may have a 
very small negative impact on each of the many people and animals who depend on 
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the reservoir for their water. Since there are so many sentient beings using the water, 
we may suppose that the total amount of negative effects will be larger if she doesn’t 
remove her watch than if she does. Still, the distribution of those effects is very differ-
ent. If she removes her watch, all of the negative effects will be borne by one child. If 
she leaves her watch on, the negative effects will be dispersed across a vast number 
of sentient beings so that each of their lives would be barely impacted. Given this, 
Uhuru might conclude, in accordance with the Disperse Additional Burdens View, 
that if she wants to produce the best possible outcome, she should dive in immedi-
ately and spare the child severe brain damage.
Suppose that Uhuru is right about this. She would then be acting rightly in con-
sequentialist terms. Notice, however, that Uhuru might not be the only person facing 
such a decision. Suppose that 30,000 others were in a similar predicament. No matter 
what anyone else did, each might act as Uhuru did, and for the same reasons. In so 
doing, each would produce the best of her available outcomes, and so be acting rightly, 
as individuals, in consequentialist terms. Still, the cumulative impact of 30,000 toxic 
batteries might be very bad. In particular, while the individual negative impact on each 
sentient being from the increased pollution level of a single watch battery might be 
very small, the collective negative impact of 30,000 batteries might be quite signifi-
cant. Thus, it might well be that, together, the quite significant negative impact on 
millions of sentient beings would be worse than the negative impact of brain damage 
on 30,000 children. If so, Uhuru and her peers would be facing a consequentialist 
Each-We Dilemma. If, in accordance with the anti-additive-aggregationist reasoning 
of the Disperse Additional Burdens View, each individual does what is best in con-
sequentialist terms, they, together, end up producing an outcome which is worse in 
consequentialist terms.
We can now see why Deaton might grant that some aid groups do more good 
than harm, and yet resist the Effective Altruist’s view that we should identify and 
support those groups. For Deaton, the issue isn’t whether aid groups are doing more 
good than harm at the individual level. His concern is with the collective impact of such 
groups. If the preceding is correct, then it could be that even if each of us, individually, 
only supports effective aid groups that are doing more good than harm, it could still be 
the case that, collectively, we are doing more harm than good.
I believe these considerations help illuminate Deaton’s position, as well as most 
people’s reactions to it. Deaton urges us not to support aid groups operating in some 
of the world’s poorest countries, largely on the grounds that doing so weakens the 
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local governments’ responsiveness to their citizens. But most people find this line of 
reasoning unbelievable. As individuals, each thinks of the great good that her par-
ticular contribution might do. She might, after all, save a life! By contrast, she thinks 
that the extent to which her individual contribution will weaken a government’s re-
sponsiveness to its citizens will be ludicrously small. Thus, the negative impact that her 
contribution will have on each of the country’s many citizens will be so small as to not 
even be measurable. Therefore, in accordance with the Disperse Additional Burdens 
View, her individual contributions will be doing more good than harm, contrary to 
what Deaton seems to be suggesting.
This reasoning is cogent, so far as it goes. But I believe it misses Deaton’s point. 
Deaton isn’t taking the ground-level perspective of what each individual donation 
is, or is not, accomplishing. Deaton is taking the 30,000 foot view of things. He is 
looking at the net impact of vast numbers of individual acts on behalf of the needy. 
And what he sees, from that perspective, is that the collective negative impact of those 
vast numbers of individual acts is quite substantial. Thus, while I, individually, may 
have virtually no impact on a government’s responsiveness to its citizens; we, to-
gether, can have a substantial impact on its responsiveness. And, of course, Deaton 
believes that, ultimately, a government’s responsiveness to its citizens is the crucial 
component for substantial and lasting social and economic progress.
This is why Deaton urges us not to support aid groups. His contention needn’t 
be that each of us, individually, is doing more harm than good. It is, rather, that we, 
collectively, are doing more harm than good. As we have seen, if principles like the 
Disperse Additional Burdens View are correct, the latter can be true, even if the 
former is not.
 In his famous article, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Singer implied that 
people of good conscience may have to do more than they otherwise would to aid 
the needy, given that not enough other people who are able to help actually do so 
(Singer 1972, pp. 232-233). Ironically, Deaton’s view is almost the opposite. He believes 
that people of good conscience may have to do less than they otherwise would to aid 
the needy, given that so many other people are doing the same thing! Underlying 
Deaton’s view is the conviction that, collectively, the direct, indirect, and interaction 
effects of such efforts do more harm than good.
Conflicts between individual and collective rationality and morality are pro-
foundly troubling.  Arguably, they lie at the root of many of our most pressing social 
and political problems, and they can be particularly intractable.  Indeed, climate 
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change, global warming, pollution, destruction or depletion of natural resources, 
protectionist economic policies, refugee crises, sky rocketing medical and insurance 
costs, restricted immigration policies, and the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction can all be seen as manifestations of such conflicts among people and/or 
nations. Unfortunately, the domain of obligations to the needy is no exception to 
this. Effective Altruists may be right that many effective aid groups are doing more 
good than harm. Given this, perhaps each of us, individually, ought morally to support 
such groups. Yet, despite this, it is possible that, collectively, we ought not to support 
such groups since, if we do, we, together, may do more harm than good. If that is our 
real-world predicament, then it may be very clear what each individual should do, and 
also very clear what we, together, should do; but what would remain painfully unclear 
is how one could defensibly reconcile the two perspectives.
PART V. A RESPONSE TO DEATON.
In this section, I want to briefly reconsider Deaton’s view that we shouldn’t 
provide direct aid to people in the world’s poorest countries, because doing so con-
tributes to poor governance within such countries. Importantly, Deaton offers numer-
ous suggestions for how we might try to indirectly help people in the world’s poorest 
countries (Deaton 2013, pp. 312-324). In doing this, he quotes favorably the economist 
Jagdish Bhagwati, who claimed that “it is hard to think of substantial increases in 
aid being spent effectively in Africa. But it is not so hard to think of more aid being 
spent productively elsewhere for Africa” (Deaton 2013, pp. 318-319). However, it is 
worth noting that many of the concrete suggestions that Deaton offers for how we 
might help people in some of the world’s poorest countries would only help badly-off 
people at some time in the future, not those whose current desperate plight cries out 
for immediate amelioration.
Recall the so-called Paradox of Poverty, which holds that aid is unnecessary in 
countries with good governance, and unhelpful in countries with bad governance. If 
this is right, then there is already poor governance in those countries where so many 
desperate people need help. So, it isn’t as if withholding aid will prevent there from 
being poor governments in such countries. They are already there, with or without 
our interventions! Hence, it appears that our choices are between letting needy people 
suffer, while they are ruled by unresponsive governments; or helping them out, while 
they are ruled by unresponsive governments! If, in fact, those are our choices, it may 
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seem plain that we ought to do the latter, notwithstanding the ways in which outside 
aid can undermine a government’s responsiveness.
Deaton seems to be suggesting that we should let people suffer now, on the 
chance that doing so may lead to long-term changes in their government’s respon-
siveness, which, in turn, may eventually lead to substantial long-term social and eco-
nomic progress. Perhaps Deaton thinks that if poor governments couldn’t count on 
outside resources to fund their agendas, and take care of their needy, they would have 
to adopt policies that would generate tax revenues to enable them to advance their 
agendas, remain in power, and deal with their countries’ problems. Presumably, the 
most sustainable way to do this would involve adopting policies that would eventu-
ally transform their societies’ neediest members from being drains on their societies’ 
resources, to being contributors to their societies’ tax bases.
Such an approach has some intuitive plausibility. Still, one might think it is a 
pretty cold-hearted and risky approach—as it abandons the present needy to their 
cruel fate, with no guarantees that doing so will lead to the necessary changes in gov-
ernment responsiveness that Deaton champions. Notice, it could turn out that the ex-
pected harms of letting many needy suffer now, might be outweighed by the expected 
benefits of far more people not being needy for decades to come, even if the expected 
harms are a virtual certainty, while the expected benefits are less likely to be real-
ized than not. In that case, Deaton’s somber advice would be endorsed by Effective 
Altruism. Even so, we might balk at following it.
Consider the standard deontological views that I ought to save my mom, rather 
than five strangers; or that I ought not to break my promise, to stop five others from 
breaking their promises; or even that I ought not to break my promise to you today, 
even if that is the only way of my keeping five other promises in the future. Similarly, 
consider the almost universal appeal of heroic rescues. There is something uplifting, 
noble, and morally compelling about searching through the rubble days after a major 
earthquake on the off chance of finding someone still alive, even though the price of 
doing so would almost never be justified on cost-effectiveness grounds.
These observations remind us there is much more to morality, and to being a 
good person, than doing the most good that we can. A thoroughly decent person 
will be virtuous, and will also give weight to deontological considerations at odds 
with maximizing the good. This is why many of us may feel queasy about Deaton’s 
recommendations, even if we accept that they might be supported by long-term, im-
partial, cost-effectiveness calculations. When we learn of people suffering from the 
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ravages of war, illness, or natural disasters, many morally relevant factors move us to 
ease their plight. Perhaps we could do more total good by pursuing other, more cost-
effective, long-term goals. However, for many of us, we are not prepared to sacrifice 
the current needy on the altar of need minimization. We would be fools, or worse, 
to ignore Deaton’s important considerations. However, we must balance those con-
siderations against all of the other considerations relevant to how a decent person 
responds to the plight of the needy (Temkin 2017a and forthcoming).
PART VI. CONCLUSION.
Some people will be frustrated or even angered by this article. Here I sit, comfort-
ably speculating about various possible negative effects that aid groups may produce. 
In doing this, I provide ammo for all those who selfishly pursue materialistic lifestyles 
of wasteful consumption, and do nothing to aid the needy. Worse, I haven’t offered 
empirical evidence to support the concerns that I have raised. Meanwhile, millions 
of flesh and blood innocents are dying or suffering from easily preventable hunger 
or disease. Don’t I know that even raising these worries may contribute to needless 
suffering?
I understand such reactions. Indeed, I have lain awake many nights with the 
same concerns. My hope is that if my worries can be laid to rest, that will be shown 
quickly, and if they cannot, people will rethink their assumptions and proceed along 
a safer, sounder path.
As for gathering and assessing empirical data, I must leave that to the social sci-
entists. My job, as a philosopher, is to help identify both empirical and normative 
issues relevant to our obligations to the needy, which I have done. Also while I deeply 
worry that this article may do more harm than good, I also worry that Deaton may 
be right, and that my previous one-sided approach to thinking about the needy may 
have been doing more harm than good. There are practical dangers in taking up any 
complex, morally important topic, but also practical dangers in failing to take up such 
topics, and letting society’s dominant social mores shape people’s views about them. 
The philosopher’s job is to carefully and honestly examine such topics, and see where 
the arguments lead. This article engages in that enterprise, even if only partially.
Unfortunately, I have had to leave so many pertinent empirical and normative 
questions open for now, that I cannot offer too much concrete advice here. However, 
let me conclude this article with various considerations to bear in mind, and paths 
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that still need to be explored, in thinking about how a good person should respond 
in a world of great need. What I offer, here, are mostly assertions, the arguments for 
which have been offered elsewhere, or must await another occasion (see Temkin 
2004, pp. 349-395 and 409-458).
First, in 1996, the World Health Organization adopted the DALY—disability-
adjusted life year—as its standard measure for assessing the negative impact of con-
ditions of ill-health (The World Health Organization “Metrics”).  Ever since then, 
many global health experts, and many Effective Altruists, have shared the common 
approach of measuring the effectiveness of interventions on behalf of the needy in 
term of the minimization of DALYs.  Though understandable, given the importance 
of health to human wellbeing, our concern for the needy must encompass much more 
than just health-related goals.  Specifically, we must pay attention to deontological-, 
virtue-, egalitarian-, fairness-, and justice-based reasons for aiding the needy, as well 
as the consequentialist-based reasons embodied by DALYs. 
Second, we must take seriously the fact that to some extent we may be directly 
or indirectly responsible for the plight of at least some of the world’s needy, and this 
may be true both individually and collectively. This raises a host of complex issues 
about individual and collective responsibility, and how to trade-off between helping 
those whose plight we may be partially responsible for, and others whose plight is 
wholly independent of us, but who may be every bit as needy or more, and whom we 
may be able to benefit to an even greater extent with equal or fewer resources.
Third, we must face the fact that what each of us, individually, has most reason 
to do, may be different from what we, together, have most reason to do. As I have 
argued, tragically, it might be that if each, individually, does what she ought to do, 
morally, on behalf of the needy, that we, collectively, will not be doing what we ought to 
do, morally, on behalf of the needy.
Fourth, there are important moral reasons to personally help the needy, even 
though this may not do the most good. Similarly, there are moral reasons to not to 
perform certain jobs, or actions, even though doing so would most benefit the needy.
Fifth, there are moral reasons to focus on people, rather than countries that are 
badly off, and it is likely that one will maximize the expected value of one’s aid efforts 
by focusing those efforts in countries with good governance, rather than in coun-
tries with poor governance. Since the overwhelming majority of the world’s neediest 
people live in the world’s two most populous nations, China and India, it may well be 
that we should focus more of our efforts to aid the needy in such countries, or even in 
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richer countries, who have desperately poor inhabitants within their borders, rather 
than in other desperately poor regions of the world where the problems of poor gov-
ernance are especially egregious. It is striking, for example, that in 2013, 3.2 million 
people lived on less than $1.90 a day in the U.S., and another 3.3 million people lived 
on less than that amount in other high income countries, and also that more people 
in the U.S are absolutely poor by global standards (5.3 million), than in Sierra Leone 
(3.2 million) or Nepal (2.5 million), and about the same as in Senegal (5.3 million) 
(Deaton 2018).
Sixth, notwithstanding the previous point, many moral considerations will 
support aiding people urgently in need now, even if they live in countries with poor 
governance, and other available efforts might have greater total expected value. 
Indeed, in some cases, I believe that we should aid those in dire straits, even if doing 
so may ultimately do more harm than good.
Seventh, we need social scientists, aid activists, Effective Altruists, and others, 
to explore even more deeply the probability of any negative effects of aid efforts. In 
doing this, they must attend to indirect, interaction, long-term, and collective effects, 
as well as direct, short-term, individual effects. Nothing short of brutal, clear-eyed 
honesty is acceptable if we hope to answer the critics of international aid and, more 
importantly, if we really hope to do as much as we can on behalf of the needy.
Eighth, ultimately our aim is to break the cycles of poverty, war, repression, 
hunger, ignorance, prejudice, and illness that cause people to be needy. Thus, we 
must guard against aid efforts that indirectly contribute to such cycles by buttress-
ing gangsters, warlords, evil leaders, or repressive or unresponsive governments. We 
must also identify effective, long-lasting approaches to undermining the root causes 
of hunger, poverty, and disease. This will need to include not only efforts to improve 
infrastructure, education, health care, energy production, and such, but efforts to 
promote equality, justice, human rights, the rule of law, and fundamental changes 
in the rules that govern national and international social, political, and economic 
interactions.
Many will dismiss such claims as banal, impractical, and unrealistic. We know 
how to provide people with mosquito nets, and we can get a general consensus for 
malaria eradication. But, many will claim, substantial changes in the global political 
and economic order are another matter, with too many powerful interests lined up 
against it for it to be feasible. Perhaps. Yet, as the old proverb states, the journey of 
a thousand miles begins with one step, and if we hope to one day attack the roots of 
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the problem of global need, and not merely its symptoms, then we must map out our 
journey, and begin taking its crucial first steps, however slow and hopeless they may 
seem.
The point about attacking the roots of global need, and not merely its symptoms 
is, of course, a familiar one. Citing another well-known proverb—feed a man a fish, 
and he eats for a day; teach a man to fish and he eats for a lifetime—aid groups have 
long trumpeted the importance of development efforts, and not merely relief efforts 
(though this long-held staple of many international aid groups in not uncontrover-
sial, and in recent years there has been significant pushback against it (see Ferguson 
2015 and Van Parijs 1995)).  Still, with a few notable exceptions—such as GiveDirectly, 
which focuses on direct cash transfers to the poor rather than development as the 
best way of aiding the needy and which has been endorsed by GiveWell as one of the 
most effective international aid organizations—aid groups have tended to focus on 
goals like improving water supplies, farming techniques, education, infrastructure, 
eradicating diseases, and empowering women, goals that seem fairly achievable via 
outside interventions. In doing this, perhaps aid groups have hoped that necessary 
social, political, and economic changes would accompany the improvements they 
achieve. Such hope is not entirely unreasonable, especially with advances in educa-
tion and female empowerment. Still, I believe we need to try to identify more direct 
ways of effectively addressing the many systemic factors giving rise to the needy, in-
cluding the many institutions, rules, and laws that regulate international political 
and economic relations.
In choosing which aid agencies to support, one will inevitably make trade-offs. 
One could devote one’s resources to relief efforts; to development efforts; or to long-
term social, political, and economic changes. A fourth approach would devote dif-
ferent portions of one’s resources to each of the three aims. Individually, it may not 
matter which of these approaches one adopts. I’m not sure about that. However, col-
lectively, I believe that we, together, should adopt the fourth approach. Moreover, on 
my pluralistic approach, I believe there will be many cases where we ought to aid the 
needy even though, in terms of pure cost-effectiveness, that money could be better 
spent elsewhere.
I remain convinced, as I have been throughout my life, that the well-off are open 
to serious moral criticism if they ignore the plight of the world’s needy. Unfortunately, 
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what one should do in light of that truth is much more complex, and murky, than 
most people have realized.
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